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Evaluating Mediation’s Future
Erin R. Archerd*

I. INTRODUCTION
Case evaluation as we currently know it in Michigan may soon be a thing of
the past. This Article is a reflection on what case evaluations evolution says about
the current state of dispute resolution both in Michigan and throughout the United
States. Ultimately, it is a call for stakeholders to think carefully about mediations
role in assisting parties in resolving disputes. As court–annexed alternative dispute
resolution (ìADRê) has become more and more popular in the United States,
jurisdictions have made a wide variety of ADR options available to litigants, but
peoples visions for those processes, especially mediation, have evolved in ways
that give many of the ADR fields founders pause. Is Michigan going to diminish
the role of one evaluative process (case evaluation) only to make its more
facilitative process (mediation) explicitly evaluative? Are there ways that courts
could support evaluative processes and still promote a model of mediation in which
mediators do not sit in judgment?
One of the difficulties parties have always faced in considering alternatives to
litigation is the shadow of the possible legal outcome of their dispute.1 In particular,
parties settling cases involving monetary claims often believe they would benefit
from having some idea of the value of their case.2 In the 1970s, Michigan courts
thought they had hit upon a process that would provide this information for parties:
case evaluation.3 Michigan is the only state that refers much of its civil docket to
case evaluationîa process in which a panel of three neutral evaluators places a
dollar value on a case, and parties are penalized if they decline to accept the
evaluators award and subsequently fail to better that award at trial.4 In addition,
Michigan also now encourages the use of mediation in civil cases, either in lieu of
or after case evaluation.5
Court commissioned studies in 2011 and 2018 showed growing dissatisfaction
with case evaluation, especially among attorneys. These study results led to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy. Many of the proposals discussed herein
are reflected in a report recently released by the Michigan Supreme Court. See MICH. SUPREME COURT,
CASE EVALUATION COURT RULES REVIEW COMMITTEE (2019). Although Professor Archerd is a
member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Michigans Dispute Resolution Section, all
opinions expressed in this article are her own. They do not reflect the opinions or positions of the State
Bar of Michigan, its Dispute Resolution Section, or any other body.
1. Carrie Menkel–Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 765–66 (1984) (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
2. As will be discussed below in Sections II and III, there is an open question about what value parties
are really looking for. Is it the value the claim is likely to be awarded at trial? Is it a settlement value,
some point at which it becomes statistically better to settle the case than to continue to pursue it?
3. Jennifer Greig, An Assessment of the Case Evaluation Process in Michigan Circuit Courts: Best
Practices and Recommendations for the Future, MACOMB CTY. COURTS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www
.oakland.edu/Assets/Oakland/polisci/files-and-documents/MPA/MPA-Sample-Projects/Greig,%20Jenn
ifer-%2016th%20Circuit%20Ct-%20Program%20Eval.pdf.
4. MICH. CT. R. 2.403.
5. MICH. CT. R. 2.411.
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discussions organized by the Michigan State Court Administrative Office
(ìSCAOê) in 2018 and a State Court rules committee formed in 2019 to consider,
among other things, changes to the case evaluation rules, notably whether to remove
sanctions for rejecting case evaluation awards.6 This Article supports changes to
the case evaluation rules but cautions against throwing out the good with the bad,
particularly with regard to what processes might replace case evaluation. Changes
to court–connected ADR should not simply remove the threat of case evaluation
sanctions, replacing case evaluation with case evaluation–lite. They also should not
establish a process that takes case evaluations place: ìevaluative mediation,ê a
scheme that places non–evaluative forms of mediation in jeopardy.
Further, this Article urges deliberation as to what, if anything, should be used
as an alternative to case evaluation. Courts should find ways to assist parties in
valuing their cases, both independently and mutually (including by using a neutral),
that do not require that parties face penalties or give up their decision–making
authority. What parties need to make these processes most effective is access to
data to give them an informed view of what a reasonable settlement value for their
case actually is. Mediationîin many forms, including non–evaluative mediationî
may be one of those processes, but courts in Michigan should not rush to make
mediation the ìnew case evaluation.ê Perhaps, even, Michigan should embrace its
unique process and continue to use case evaluation in a targeted fashion. The
choices Michigan makes will influence other court systems throughout the country,
either by serving as a model for how more facilitative styles of mediation can thrive
in the Twenty–First Century or as a model for increasingly evaluative mediation
systems.
Section II of this Article will provide background on the use of mediation and
case evaluation in the state of Michigan. Mediation saw widespread growth through
the 1990s and adoption statewide at the turn of the Twenty–First Century, but case
evaluation has been a long–standing procedure in Michigan for nearly four decades.
Section III explores the growing dissatisfaction with case evaluation and movement
toward greater use of mediation throughout the state. Section IV examines the
many dispute resolution options currently available in Michigan courts and
considers how they might be used as alternatives to case evaluation. Section V
cautions against making mediation an explicitly evaluative process, and Section VI
serves as a call to dispute resolution practitioners throughout the United States to
support efforts to keep mediation an inherently facilitative process.

II. MEDIATION AND CASE EVALUATION IN MICHIGAN COURTS
The growth of mediation in Michigan has mirrored that of many jurisdictions
throughout the country. What is most interesting about Michigan, however, is that
mediation grew in the shadow of another non–binding, but much more evaluative
process, which the state now refers to as ìcase evaluation.ê7 That process appears
to be unique in its statewide and mandatory usage. While some other jurisdictions
have ìcase evaluationê processes on the books, they do not seem to be used with
6. The rules committee is still meeting and, as of September 2019, has not yet released rules for
notice and comment by the public. Accordingly, the actual content of proposed rule changes is currently
speculative. It is possible (though, in the authors opinion, not likely) that the proposed rules might not
include the removal of sanctions for failure to accept case evaluators awards.
7. See Section II(B), infra, regarding nomenclature.
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the same frequency, and none seem to carry similar sanctions for failing to adopt
evaluators awards.8 The most useful analogue for case evaluation in other states is
court–annexed, non–binding arbitration. Only a few states9 have these kinds of
programs, and of those, only a few feature sanctions for failure to accept arbitrators
recommendations.10

A. Michigan’s Tort Environment and its Impact on ADR
It is impossible to fully examine the historical and current use of ADR in
Michigan without a brief digression into tort law in the state, particularly personal
injury protection (ìPIPê) claims. PIP claims are a type of no–fault insurance claim
that individuals injured in an auto accident can bring against their own insurance
company. In other words, insurance holders own insurance covers items like
medical expenses, whether or not the injured party caused the accident. Michigan
requires no–fault insurance, and the state will not give car owners license plates
without proof of such insurance.11 These policies must cover medical expenses,
wage loss, replacement services, and damage to others property.12 Until very
recently, PIP claims covered medical costs for the life of the injured claimant.13
This potential for life–long medical coverage has led to many disputes between
injured first–person claimants and their insurers.14
These coverage requirements are widely blamed for Michigans infamously
high auto insurance rates, and in May 2019, Governor Gretchen Whitmer signed

8. See, e.g., Civil Mediation, D.C. COURTS, https://www.dccourts.gov/services/mediation-matters/ci
vil (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) (describing a non–binding ìcase evaluationê process that sounds like
evaluative mediation); DOUGLAS H. YARN & GREGORY TODD JONES, GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 12:5 (2014 ed., 2014) (ìCase evaluation may
be similar to [early neutral evaluation (ENE)] but not occur as ìearlyê in the life of the litigation. In
some programs, case evaluation involves a more direct evaluative component, while the version of ENE
in the same program may involve evaluation only when both parties request the neutral to do so. . . . The
Georgia Dispute Resolution Rules recognize case evaluation and early neutral evaluation; however, very
few courts have adopted a program that specifically encourages use of these processes.ê).
9. See Theresa G. Campbell & Sharon L. Pizzuti, Survey of Other States, Appendix B to The
Effectiveness of Case Evaluation and Mediation in Michigan Circuit Courts, MICH. SUPREME COURT
65–68 (Oct. 31, 2011) (listing Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington, and the District of Columbia) [hereinafter 2011 Case Evaluation Study].
10. Id. (Arizona: rejecting party must improve on award by 25% or pay opposing side costs; Hawaii:
discretionary sanctions for party not improving award by 30%; Illinois: sanctions established locally;
Nevada: sanctions for not improving by 20% or 10% depending on amount of award; New Jersey:
sanctions if rejecting party does not improve upon award by 20%; Oregon: plaintiff must improve upon
award 10%, defendant 20% to receive sanctions against other party; and Washington: sanctions may be
applied if rejecting party does not improve its position at trial).
11. See Mich. Dept of Ins. & Fin. Serv., Brief Explanation of Michigan No–Fault Insurance (2019),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis_ofis_ip202_25083_7.pdf. Of course, many people do not
maintain their insurance, which is infamously costly, particularly in the city of Detroit.
12. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3107–500.3121 (West 2019).
13. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(c) (West 2019); 2019 Mich. Pub. Acts 1, 19 (effective
July 1, 2020); see also Aaron Mondry, Whitmer, Republicans Reach Deal on Auto Insurance Reform,
CURBED DETROIT, https://detroit.curbed.com/2019/5/24/18638931/michigan-auto-insurance-reformwhitmer-republicans-deal (last updated June 3, 2019, 4:49 PM).
14. See, e.g., Vandercook v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 923 N.W.2d 921 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (wherein
plaintiff sought to recover PIP benefits for expenses related to injuries sustained in automobile accident).
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no–fault auto insurance reform legislation that will place caps on medical benefits.15
Although this reform will not end disputes over coverage, it may diminish some of
the benefit of bringing such cases against insurers. On the other hand, insurance
companies point to an increase in the default minimum liability coverage required
under the new law as a potential driver for increased claim disputes (and higher
premiums).16
PIP claims are most numerous in counties with the largest populations, and
they take up a significant amount of the civil court dockets in Southeast Michigan,
the area around Detroit. In 2017, no–fault automobile insurance claims made up
32% of the civil cases in Wayne Countys Third Circuit Court,17 30.5% of the civil
cases in Macomb Countys Sixteenth Circuit Court,18 and 18% of civil cases in
Oakland Countys Sixth Circuit Court,19 the three main counties in the Detroit
Metro area.
Michigan also has a significant caseload of third–party automobile negligence
tort lawsuits, which can be brought in cases of death, serious impairment of body
function, or serious, permanent disfigurement.20 Like PIP claims, these third–party
cases comprise a large percentage of cases in Wayne (20.6%),21 Macomb (27.1%),22
and Oakland Counties (20.5%).23 For Wayne and Macomb Counties, automobile–
related cases make up well over half of circuit court civil dockets. These circuit
courts have come to rely on case evaluation, in particular, as a means of triaging
15. H.B. 4397, 100th Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019). Michigan has the highest state average for car
insurance in the country: $2,693, versus a national average of $1,470. Detroit has the highest car
insurance in the state, with an average of $5,464/year. Aaron Mondry, Michigan Auto Insurance Reform
Explained, CURBED DETROIT (May 24, 2019), https://detroit.curbed.com/2019/5/14/18623153/michigan
-auto-insurance-reform-bill-explained.
16. Paul Egan, Insurance Official: No Guaranteed Savings Under New Michigan Auto Law, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (June 11, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/06/
11/no-guaranteed-savings-under-new-michigan-auto-law/1369364001/ (ìThe new law calls for a
dramatic, and somewhat surprising, increase in mandated liability limits . . . and allows personal injury
attorneys to push for larger and more frequent lawsuits.ê).
17. See 2015æ2018 Wayne Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, MICH. COURTS,
https://courts.michigan.gov/education/stats/performance-measures/Documents/Wayne/C03WayneCirc
uitDetail.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) (no–fault automobile claims were 6,018 of the 18,672 total
incoming civil claims in Wayne County in 2017). Michigan organizes its trial courts into district courts
(civil claims up to $25,000 and criminal misdemeanor) and circuit courts (civil claims over $25,000 and
felony criminal). Mich. Trial Courts, MICH. COURTS, https://courts.michigan.gov/courts/trialcourts/
pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
18. See 2015æ2018 Macomb Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, MICH. COURTS,
https://courts.michigan.gov/education/stats/performance-measures/Documents/Macomb/C16MacombC
ircuitDetail.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) (no–fault automobile claims were 1,362 of the 4,461 total
incoming civil claims in Macomb County in 2017).
19. See 2015æ2018 Oakland Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, MICH. COURTS, https://courts.mic
higan.gov/education/stats/performance-measures/Documents/Oakland/C06OaklandCircuitDetail.pdf
(last visited Dec. 12, 2019) (no–fault automobile claims were 1,146 of the 6,357 total incoming civil
claims in Oakland County in 2017).
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135 (West 2019).
21. See 2015æ2018 Wayne Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, supra note 17 (personal
injury/automobile negligence claims were 3,842 of the 18,672 total incoming civil claims in Wayne
County in 2017).
22. See 2015æ2018 Macomb Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, supra note 18 (personal
injury/automobile negligence claims were 1,209 of the 4,461 total incoming civil claims in Macomb
County in 2017).
23. See 2015æ2018 Oakland Circuit Court Civil Clearance Rates, supra note 19 (personal
injury/automobile negligence claims were 1,304 of the 6,357 total incoming civil claims in Oakland
County in 2017).
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such cases, either to encourage cases to settle or to filter cases through additional
ADR processes that will ideally lead to settlement. For example, the Third Circuit
Court in Wayne County (Detroit) automatically refers to mediation any claim that
receives less than twenty–five–thousand dollars in case evaluation in an effort to
further encourage settlement before trial.24
This context is important to the arguments posed in this Article because the
mass of automobile–related cases, and the courts heavy reliance on case evaluation
to help resolve them, has bolstered an impression that most of Michigans civil
cases are ìjust money casesê to be settled with a dollar figure and little more.25
Many lawyers and judges believe that these types of cases are best settled using
some type of evaluative process, be it trial or a trial alternative. Many courts view
case evaluation as critical to address these kinds of tort and insurance disputes.

B. Case Evaluation
Some version of case evaluation has been in place in Michigan, primarily to
address tort claims, for nearly fifty years.26 In that time, the state has seen huge
growth in ADR in the courts, though not without some confusion as to nomenclature
for ADR practitioners from out of state. For many years, ìcase evaluationê was
referred to in Michigan as ìmediation,ê and mediation was called ìfacilitationê in
many Michigan courts. The confusion between the terms ìcase evaluationê and
ìmediationê was clarified by updates to the Michigan Court Rules in 2000, but the
specter of ìMichigan Mediationê lingers.27 Moreover, many in the legal community
in Michigan still use the term ìfacilitationê to refer to mediation, and this use
reflects the long–standing definition of civil mediation as a facilitative process.28
Currently, case evaluation is mandatory for tort claims and discretionary for
other civil claims.29 In case evaluation, a panel of three court–appointed attorneys
renders a monetary evaluation of the case that parties must either accept or reject.30
24. Third Judicial Circuit of Mich., Local Admin. Order 2016–04 (July 26, 2016),
https://www.3rdcc.org/Documents/Administration/Orders/2016-04%5EMediation%20Plan%20for%20
Cases%20Evaluated%20for%20an%20Amount%20of%20$25,000%20or%20Less%5E%5E.pdf.
25. See, e.g., John Lande, Toward a More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 321,
327 (2000).
26. See Mich. Supreme Court, Trial Courts Appendix A: Courts and Judges, Appendix A to Michigan
Supreme Court Annual Report 2011 (2011), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Reso
urces/Documents/Publications/Statistics/2011/2011%20Michigan%20Supreme%20Court%20Annual%
20Report.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Symposium, The State of the States: Dispute Resolution in the Courts, 1 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 4, 31–32 (1999) (Mr. Doug Van Epps explaining that Michigan has ìnon–binding
case evaluation with penalties; its called Michigan Mediation.ê); MICH. CT. R. 2.403 amend. Staff
Comments (noting ì[t]he amendments . . . are mainly to change terminology, replacing èmediation, as
used in current MICH. CT. R. 2.403, with the term ècase evaluation. èMediation will be used to describe
the facilitative process established in MICH. CT. R. 2.411, in keeping with the generally accepted usage
of the term.ê). On behalf of the mediators of Michigan, the author would like to affirm that we have
been using non–binding mediation throughout the state for many years and that we do know the
difference between case evaluation, mediation, and arbitration.
28. In MICH. CT. R. 2.411(A)(2) (ì[D]efining mediation as a process in which a neutral third party
facilitates communication between parties, assists in identifying issues, and helps explore solutions to
promote a mutually acceptable settlement. A mediator has no authoritative decision–making power.ê).
29. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(B)(1).
30. Local courts can create their own plans for case evaluator selection. The court rules provide that
applicants must be in practice for at least five years with a substantial amount of their practice devoted
to civil litigation and in good standing of the State Bar of Michigan. MICH. CT. R. 2.402(2).
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Each party prepares a case summary of no more than twenty double–spaced pages
and sends it to the opposing party and the courts ADR clerk. Late filings, including
the submission of many pages of supporting documentation the night before a case
evaluation hearing, are a common problem, and court clerks can charge late fees to
encourage timely submissions.31 Attorneys are then given fifteen minutes for oral
presentations before the evaluation panel.32 Parties are allowed to attend the case
evaluation hearing, but they are not allowed to testify.33
Within fourteen days of the hearing, the panel must issue a written award that
includes a separate dollar amount for each claim or counterclaim. The panel does
not have to issue a reasoned opinion in setting its dollar figure, and it cannot make
equitable rulings, but panelists can consider equitable claims in their monetary
awards.34 Each party must then accept or reject the award in its entirety within
twenty–eight days, with silence constituting a rejection.35 If the parties all accept
the award, judgment is entered in the award amount (or a party may pay the award
amount within twenty–eight days and have the case dismissed with prejudice).36
If a party rejects the case evaluators award and ultimately fails to improve that
award by more than ten percent at trial, the opposing party may seek sanctions, 37
including costs and reasonable attorney fees.38 If both parties reject the case
evaluation, then the opposing party is entitled to costs only if the verdict is more
favorable to that party than the case evaluation award.39 For example, say a case
evaluation panel awards a plaintiff $100,000, and the plaintiff rejects the award
while the defendant accepts it. If the case goes to trial and the plaintiff is awarded
31. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(I)(2).
32. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(J)(3).
33. However, ì[i]f scars, disfigurement, or other unusual conditions exist, they may be demonstrated
to the panel by a personal appearance.ê MICH. CT. R. 2.403(J)(1).
34. MICH CT. R. 2.403(K).
35. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(L). Failure to respond constitutes a rejection. If there are multiple parties
involved in the case evaluation, a party must accept or reject all awards with respect to any particular
opposing party and can make their acceptance contingent on the opposing party accepting. Id. at
2.403(L)(3).
36. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(M).
37. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(O)(1). ìIf a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to verdict,
that party must pay the opposing partys actual costs unless the verdict is more favorable to the rejecting
party than the case evaluation. However, if the opposing party has also rejected the evaluation, a party
is entitled to costs only if the verdict is more favorable to that party than the case evaluation.ê Id. at
2.403(O)(3) (noting that a verdict is considered more favorable to a defendant if it is more than ten
percent below the case evaluation after adjusting for costs and interest and, if applicable adjusting future
damages accordingly, or if the defendant is found not liable. A verdict is considered more favorable to
the plaintiff if it is more than ten percent above the case evaluation).
38. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(O)(6) (noting that actual costs are ìthose costs taxable in any civil actionê and
ìa reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial judge for
services necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation, which may include legal services provided
by attorneys representing themselves or the entity for whom they work, including the time and labor of
any legal assistantê); Haliw v. City of Sterling Heights, 691 N.W.2d 753, 706 (Mich. 2005) (holding
appellate attorney fees and costs are not recoverable as case evaluation sanctions). In determining
reasonable attorney fees, Michigan courts are generally guided by Rule 1.5(a) of the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct, listing factors a lawyer should consider in determining fee. Wood v. Detroit
Automobile Inter–Ins. Exch., 321 N.W.2d 653 (Mich. 1982) (adopting reasonableness guidelines); Smith
v. Khouri, 751 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Mich. 2008) (holding that courts should begin by determining ìthe
reasonable hourly or daily rate customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, using
reliable surveys or other credible evidence.ê).
39. MICH. CT. R. 2.403(O)(1). Noting a ìverdictê includes a jury verdict, a court judgment after a
nonjury trial, or a judgment entered on a motion). Id. at 2.403(O)(2).
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$100,000, then the defendant (who accepted the case evaluation award) could seek
sanctions against the plaintiff. Say, however, that both the plaintiff and the
defendant rejected the case evaluation award, and the plaintiff wins $100,000 at
trial. In that case, the defendant cannot seek sanctions against the plaintiff because
the defendant also rejected the case evaluation award and did not improve on the
award at trial. Cost sanctions are only granted if the case evaluation award was
unanimous.40
Another example may be helpful to visualize how case evaluation works.
Say that Paula slips and falls on a puddle of water in Sallys Salon. Paula
sues Sally for $100,000 in a Michigan circuit court, and Sallys insurer is
representing the salon as the defendant in the case evaluation. Paulas
attorney can easily prove $40,000 in damages via medical bills Paula
incurred after the accident and is hoping to garner some sympathy at trial
since Paula also has three children and was their primary caregiver prior
to the accident. Sallys insurer offered Paula $50,000 before the case
evaluation to settle the case. Paula refused the settlement offer.
During the case evaluation, the insurer centers its oral presentation on the
$50,000 offer it had already made, justifying its fairness before the panel.
Paulas attorney points out that Paula is still unable to care for her children,
all of whom are now in day care or afterschool care at a cost of nearly
$3,000 per month. Paulas attorney also tries to protest that prior
settlement offers should not be considered by the panel but is reminded
that the rules of evidence do not apply in case evaluations.41
The panel unanimously decides on an award of $65,000. There is no
reasoned opinion, but each panelist internally justified the award a bit
differently. One panelist felt that $65,000 would be a good settlement
value. If the insurer was willing to pay $50,000, what was another $15,000
compared to the cost of trial or protracted settlement negotiations?
Another panelist felt like Paula had a weak case for proving much more
than $40,000 at trial, so anything more than that was a gift that her attorney
should graciously accept. The third panelist was inclined to award Paula
more, but the panel had 11 other cases to evaluate that day and he did not
feel like debating the award with the other two panelists.
Sallys insurer accepted the case evaluation award. Paula rejected it. Paula
later won at trial and was awarded $55,000 by the jury. Despite her
victory, Paula did not improve on the evaluation award by more than ten
percent, so the insurer sought and was awarded its actual costs, which
totaled $30,000. Paulas attorney was being paid on a thirty percent
contingency, so Paula ended up with just $8,500 for her trouble: the

40. Id. at 2.403(O)(7). Anecdotally, several Michigan attorneys have mentioned concerns about
panels deliberately issuing non–unanimous decisions, arguably as a way for panelists to maintain their
credibility as plaintiff or defense side attorneys.
41. Id. at 2.403(J)(2).
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$55,000 award minus $30,000 in defendants actual costs minus $16,500
to her attorney.42
Case evaluation sanctions like the ones levied against Paula have,
understandably, led to widespread discontent among plaintiffs on whom these
sanctions are often more punishing. The lack of acceptance of case evaluation
awards, in turn, frustrates defense counsel, who view the process as one more hoop
they have to jump through on the way to trial or, more likely, settlement.

C. Mediation
In 2000, Michigan adopted comprehensive court rules around the use of
ADR.43 The court rules for mediation have a facilitative focus, defining civil
mediation as ìa process in which a neutral third party facilitates communication
between parties, assists in identifying issues, and helps explore solutions to promote
a mutually acceptable settlement. A mediator has no authoritative decision–making
power.ê44 As will be discussed below, the SCAO requires mediation training for
the court rosters have a facilitative focus.
Michigan does not require formal state certification to call oneself a mediator,
but to serve on court rosters, mediators must complete a forty–hour training
approved by SCAO, observe two civil mediations, and be observed conducting a
mediation.45 Court mediators must also have a J.D. or graduate degree in conflict
resolution or, alternatively, forty hours or eighteen cases of mediation experience.46
More rigorous training requirements apply to domestic relations mediators,
including forty–eight hours of training and eighty hours of mediation experience
for those who do not meet the degree requirement.47
The actual administration of court mediation programs varies widely by
jurisdiction. In some district courts, almost all cases are referred to mediation,48
while in other courts most civil cases first participate in case evaluation. 49 Some
courts, particularly smaller ones, coordinate with a local Community Dispute
Resolution Program for almost all of their mediation needs.50 Courts with larger
dockets have their own dedicated ADR programs, such as Wayne Countys

42. Id. at 2.403(O)(3) (noting that in the case presented here, Defendant insurer would also be entitled
to costs if it had rejected the case evaluation award here, because the verdict is more favorable to the
defendant than the evaluation); Tevis v. Amex Assurance Co., 770 N.W.2d 16, 22 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding that joint stipulation by the parties as to damages can still be considered in determining whether
a verdict is more favorable to a party).
43. MICH. CT. R. 2.411.
44. Id. at 2.411(A)(2).
45. Id. at 2.411(F)(2)(c).
46. The experiential component can be spread out over two years. Id. at 2.411(F)(2)(b)(ii). Small
claims mediator qualifications are left to the discretion of the district courts. Id. at 2.411(F)(1).
47. MICH. CT. R. 3.216.
48. For example, Grand Traverse County.
49. See discussion of Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne Counties, supra Section II(A).
50. Community Dispute Resolution Program, MICH. COURTS, https://courts.michigan.gov/administra
tion/scao/officesprograms/odr/pages/community-dispute-resolution-program.aspx (last visited Oct. 12,
2019).
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Mediation Tribunal Association, that maintain the list of civil and domestic
mediators for the circuit court and coordinate case evaluations. 51

III. GROWING CRITIQUE OF CASE EVALUATION
Over the past decade, the Michigan SCAO has commissioned two studiesîan
initial 2011 study and a follow–up in 2018îlooking at the use of case evaluation
and mediation in the states circuit courts.52 These studies sought to gauge the effect
of case evaluation and mediation on case disposition (both the time from filing to
disposition and the percentage of cases reaching a settlement or consent judgment),
as well as to survey attorneys, judges, and court administrators perceptions of the
use and effectiveness of case evaluation and mediation.
The studies found that settlement rates were similar for cases that used either
case evaluation or mediation: about eighty percent or higher. The key difference
was in time to settlement. On average, cases that used case evaluation took three to
four months longer to dispose of than cases that solely used mediation (a difference
likely due to mediations being held sooner and settlements being reached more
often during mediations).53 In contrast, cases that went to case evaluation rarely
resulted in parties accepting the award. Both parties accepted the evaluation panels
award in only fifteen percent of cases in the 2018 study.54 Although most of the
cases that went to case evaluation did ultimately settle before trial, it is hard to gauge
the effect that case evaluation had on those settlements, as many of those cases were
also mediated after the parties rejected the case evaluators award. 55
Stakeholder perceptions of the two processes also reflected a preference for
mediation over case evaluation. More judges than attorneys felt that mediation
helped dispose of cases within time guidelines56 and that more cases settled as a
direct result of mediation.57 On the whole, judges in the 2018 study showed much
more support for case evaluation than attorneys, but compared to the 2011 study,
judges support of case evaluation appears to be dropping. The percentage of
Michigan judges who said case evaluation was effective fell from sixty–nine
percent in 2011 to fifty–three percent in 2018, and the percentage who said they
would voluntarily use case evaluation fell from eighty–three percent to sixty–six
percent.58
Intriguingly, although the case–evaluation process seems to have arisen as a
tort–reform mechanism meant to keep cases out of court, the studies articulated the
two predominant goals of case evaluation as ì(1) to provide a true valuation of the
51. MEDIATION TRIBUNAL ASSN, https://www.mediationtribunal.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
Wayne County also has a CDRP that handles some court–referred cases, and much of the school–based
ADR in the county. Wayne County Dispute Resolution Center, WAYNE CTY. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CTR., https://wcdrc.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
52. Michael D. Campbell & Sharon L. Pizzuti, Case Evaluation and Mediation in Michigan Circuit
Courts: A Follow Up Study, COURTLAND CONSULTING (2018), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administrat
ion/SCAO/OfficesPrograms/ODR/Documents/2018%20Mediation%20and%20Case%20Evaluation%2
0Study.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Case Evaluation Study].
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Eighty–three percent of judges felt this for mediation versus forty–five percent for case evaluation.
Id. at 5.
57. Fifty–nine percent for mediation versus forty–one percent for case evaluation. Id. at 5.
58. 2018 Case Evaluation Study, supra note 52, at 8.
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caseê and ì(2) to provide a number around which parties can negotiate.ê59 These
goals may be a post hoc reevaluation of the process, which at one time appeared to
better serve as a means of ultimately disposing of cases.60 If, indeed, these are the
goals of case evaluation, then their purposes could be accomplished through any
number of other processes, such as early neutral evaluation or, as discussed in more
detail below, potentially mediation. In contrast, the studies described the goal of
mediation as, ì[d]isposition of the case by agreement of the parties.ê61 It seems odd
that mediations goal would be the one explicitly focusing on disposing of the case,
while case evaluations does not, though the definition does reflect mediations
greater settlement rate. At a minimum, it seems to show that courts do not expect
cases to settle by parties accepting their case evaluation award.
Both judges and attorneys rated mediators expertise more highly than that of
case evaluation panelists.62 In many ways, this is not a fair comparison. Case
evaluators are meant to be subject matter experts, while mediators may be, but need
not be, experts in the topic of the mediation.63 In fact, many mediators like to say
that they are ìprocess expertsê rather than subject matter experts. It can be
problematicîand in some cases even illegalîfor mediators to give legal advice
during a mediation, though mediators often do showcase their subject matter
expertise in other ways through interactions with parties during the mediation. 64
Case evaluators, on the other hand, have very little opportunity to demonstrate
expertise of any kind during their proceedings; they conduct thirty to sixty minute
hearings with parties and then issue an award of a dollar figure. Thus, even if the
evaluators are experts in their area of law, they are given no real opportunity to
display their expertise other than by giving a dollar figure, which is likely to
displease all the parties in the case. Defendants may think the dollar amount too
high and plaintiffs too low, and both parties can attribute it to lack of sound
reasoning by case evaluators who do not have to provide a reasoned opinion for
their awards.
Partly in response to the initial 2011 case evaluation study, ADR practitioners
in Michigan began advocating for a greater use of mediation in civil disputes in
Michigans circuit courts, culminating in a push for automatic mediation of civil
disputes.65 In a 2017 white paper to the State Bar Dispute Resolution Section,
Professor Mary Bedikian set forth reasons why Michigan should adopt an automatic
mediation program, including that such a program would: give clients an
opportunity to address issues beyond the legal claim; provide superior outcomes
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id.; 2011 Case Evaluation Study, supra note 9, at 22. In the 2011 study, the case evaluation
acceptance rate was twenty–two percent. Id.
61. 2018 Case Evaluation Study, supra note 52, at 9.
62. Id. at 5.
63. As the court rules for case evaluator qualifications suggest, it may be difficult to find enough
qualified attorneys to serve. MICH. CT. R. 2.404(2) (ìIf there are insufficient numbers of potential case
evaluators meeting the qualifications stated in this rule, the plan may provide for consideration of
alternative qualifications.ê).
64. There is long–standing debate about whether mediators can, or should, give legal advice or bring
their legal knowledge to bear on a dispute. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel–Meadow, When Dispute Resolution
Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997);
Jacqueline M. Nolan, Lawyers, Non–Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly
from a Problem–Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Mary A. Bedikian, White Paper on Automatic Mediation Prepared for the SBM Section
Council, 26 MICH. DISP. RESOL. J. 1, 8 (2018).
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that can attend to interpersonal dynamics; lead to results that parties view as more
fair; resolve matters more quickly and cheaply; increase the likelihood of
settlement; avoid multiple court proceedings; preserve party self–determination;
and remove the discretionary factor from case referral by judges who are not used
to ADR.66 Bedikian pointed to the differences between case evaluation and
mediation reported in the 2011 case evaluation study in arguing that mediation
would be an overall better ADR process, particularly if made automatic.67
In the summer of 2018, shortly after the release of the 2018 follow–up study,
the SCAO convened a summit of ADR providers and users from throughout the
state. Generally, the views of the summit participants aligned with the data from
the study, showing a preference for mediation over case evaluation. The majority
of these practitioners and administrators believed that case evaluation should be
made voluntary or amended to remove sanctions and that panels should provide
litigants with a settlement range rather than a single award figure. 68 Participants
also pointed out a perceived inconsistency in the numbers that case evaluation
panels were offeringîwere the panels giving the actual value of the case as they
saw it or a recommended settlement number to the litigants?69 They recommended
that the court rules specify what kind of number was being offered by case
evaluators. Similarly to the 2018 Case Evaluation Study, the participants in the
summit had an especially positive view about the use of mediation in resolving civil
disputes, noting that it worked with many different types of disputes, had high rates
of participation and compliance, and helped shorten the duration of cases even if
settlement was not reached.70
The growing critique of case evaluation in Michigan led the SCAO Dispute
Resolution Office to convene a rules committee in 2019 to look at the current case
evaluation rules and make proposed changes to the state Supreme Court. In keeping
with the recommendations from the ADR Summit, it seems likely that there will be
a proposal to remove sanctions for refusing to accept the evaluators award.71 The
removal of sanctions will lead to greater emphasis on Michigans Offer of
Judgement rule, which has more teeth than the federal rule in that it allows for costs
and reasonable attorney fees.72 The changes are also likely to lead to an uptick in
mediation referrals, and there is currently discussion about whether to incorporate
evaluative mediation expressly within the civil mediation rules. A form of
66. Id. at 9–10.
67. Id. (the State Bar Dispute Resolution Section proposed an automatic mediation statute, but after
discussion among various stakeholders, especially judges, decided to explore changes to court rules
instead. Currently, there is no statewide court rule requiring mediation in civil cases).
68. Mich. Supreme Court, State Court Admin. Office, & Office of Dispute Resolution, 2018 ADR
Summit Meeting Summary, MICH. COURTS (Aug. 2018), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/
SCAO/OfficesPrograms/ODR/Documents/2018ADRSummitReportFINAL.pdf.
69. Id. at 3. This same issue comes up when mediators are asked to give mediator proposals. Is the
number that a mediator gives what the mediator believes a jury would award at the end of trial, or is it a
figure that the mediator, based on what has been learned from the parties, believes parties would settle
for in order to avoid trial. While many mediators are wary of giving the parties proposed dollar figures
(or proposing other solutions to the dispute), most will do so in at least some situations. Many mediators
are careful to specify what kind of figure they are offering to parties.
70. 2018 ADR Summit Meeting Summary, supra note 68, at 2.
71. 2018 Case Study Evaluation, supra note 52, at 59. The rules committee has released its
recommendations to a few stake holder groups over the summer of 2019, but a full set of proposed rule
changes has yet to have been agreed upon by the committee. Those proposals, if any are made, are likely
to be released toward the end of 2019.
72. MICH. CT. R. 2.405; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
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evaluative mediation already exists within the domestic mediation rules, and a
current proposal being discussed would incorporate some of that language into the
existing civil mediation rule. While there has not been a proposal to make
evaluative mediation the default form of mediation, adding evaluative mediation to
the civil mediation rule will certainly call into question whether facilitative
mediation, which is the form currently in place under the court rule, is the default.
For reasons discussed below, this is likely to encourage more requests for and orders
to evaluative mediation and, ultimately, weaken mediation as a unique ADR tool.
There is a final caveat to this discussion of potential changes to the case
evaluation rules. Even if changes to the case evaluation rules are proposed by a
state court rules committee, there is still a lengthy process before any proposed
changes are adopted by the Michigan State Supreme Court, which has the final say
on changes to the court rules. Before amending a court rule, the Supreme Court
notifies the State Bar and posts a notice on the court website, allowing time for
public comment electronically and setting up a public hearing on the rule changes.73
Moreover, to the extent any rules are impacted by state statutes, such statutes must
also be considered so that court rules do not conflict with substantive state laws.
Case evaluation is mandatory in tort cases pursuant to Michigans Revised
Judicature Act.74 While the statute does not lay out the exact form under which case
evaluation must be conducted, the statute itself calls for sanctioning parties who
reject evaluation awards. It is possible that justices on the state supreme court might
feel that removing sanctions for failure to accept case evaluators awards is straying
too far from the substance of case evaluation as set forth in the statute. In that case,
proposed changes to the case evaluation rules might not be adopted by the court,
and case evaluation may continue in its current form, pending revision of the statute
by the state legislature.

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO CASE EVALUATION
As Michigan anticipates a greater use of mediation in lieu of case evaluation,
it is worth pausing to consider what other processes could take the place of case
evaluation and whether those processes might be better replacements than
defaulting to mediationîparticularly the evaluative mediation currently being
contemplated. Two of the best candidates to replace the valuation component and
the sanction component of case evaluation are early neutral evaluation and offers of
judgment, both of which currently exist under the Michigan court rules.

A. Early Neutral Evaluation
One case evaluation substitute that seems largely missing from current
discussions, but that warrants more serious consideration, is early neutral

73. MICH. CT. R. 1.201; Michigan Courts: Proposed Rules, Rules Amendments, Administrative
Orders, and Appointments, MICH. COURTS, https://courts.michigan.gov/courts/michigansupremecourt/
rules/court-rules-admin-matters/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
74. The court rules for case evaluation specifically reference Chapter 49 (Medical Malpractice
Mediation) and Chapter 49A (Tort Action Mediation). MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4901 (West
1986). Both the medical malpractice and tort evaluations call for sanctions against parties who have
rejected evaluations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.4921, 600.4969 (West 1986).
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evaluation.75 Unlike case evaluation, early neutral evaluation is often conducted by
just one neutral. Given the already existing pool of case evaluators in Michigan, it
should be relatively easy to transition many of the cases that currently are ordered
to case evaluation to some form of early neutral evaluation instead. In its current
form, parties are typically responsible for selecting a neutral.76 Early neutral
evaluation is also recommended for complex litigation, in which the neutral can be
used to clarify key issues at trial and narrow the scope of discovery.77 However, it
would not be hard to focus neutrals more narrowly on providing evaluations similar
to those currently being offered in case evaluation.
The SCAO already recommends that judges in Michigan consider ordering
parties to use early neutral evaluation to help narrow the focus of the dispute. 78 It
categorizes early neutral evaluation as evaluative, along with other processes like
mini–trials with mock juries and case evaluation, pointing out that these kinds of
processes can help parties identify the strengths and weaknesses of their case,
modify their settlement positions, and adjust their expectations.79 According to the
SCAO, the neutral in early neutral evaluation has two primary roles:
[T]o play the ìdevils advocateê with both parties, and to provide a vehicle
for aggressive case management. The process results in parties identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and the risks the litigation
poses. It can also educate a recalcitrant litigant who may have an
unrealistic expectation of the outcome of the litigation.80
The SCAO is already recommending that parties use mediation prior to court–
ordered case evaluation, but many judges and parties are still using case evaluation
first.81 Use of early neutral evaluation at a point that is actually early in the litigation
process could serve many of the same roles that an early mediation would,
especially a more evaluative mediation, while still preserving the option of
mediation for cases that are unable to settle after early neutral evaluation.

B. Offers of Judgment
Like many jurisdictions, Michigan has a rule for ìOffers to Stipulate to Entry
of Judgmentê (ìOffer of Judgment ruleê).82 The Michigan Offer of Judgment rule
calls for sanctions if a written offer is not accepted by the offeree, and it allows
either side to make an offer, not just the defendant.83 The rule sets an ìaverage
75. See, e.g., Early Neutral Evaluation, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute
resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/early_neutral_evaluation/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
76. Mich. Supreme Court, State Court Admin. Office, & Office of Dispute Resolution, Michigan
Judges Guide to ADR Practice and Procedure Version 1.0, 32–33 (2015), https://courts.michigan.gov/
Administration/SCAO/OfficesPrograms/ODR/Documents/ADR%20Guide%2004092015.pdf
[hereinafter Judges Guide to ADR Version 1.0].
77. Id. at 32–33.
78. Id. at 9–10.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 33.
81. Id. See 2018 Case Evaluation Study, supra note 52.
82. See, e.g., 2 A.L.R. 279 (2005).
83. MICH. CT. R. 2.405. The definition of an offer under the rule is ìa written notification to an
adverse party of the offerors willingness to stipulate to the entry of a judgment in a sum certain, which
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offer,ê the average of the initial written offer and any counter–offer made by the
offeree, that parties must improve upon at trial.84 The party receiving the offer (or
counter–offer) may accept it, expressly reject it, or reject it by allowing it to lapse.85
If the verdict, plus interests and costs from filing through the date of the offer, is
more favorable to the offeror than the offer, then the offeree must pay the offerors
costs and reasonable attorney fees for the entire case.86 Either party can make an
offer and thus create the possibility of sanctions if the opposing side does not
improve upon the average of the offers at trial. There is some incentive to encourage
early settlement offers since an offeree who has not made a counteroffer is not
entitled to costs ìunless the offer was made less than 42 days before trial.ê87 Here
is how an offer of judgment might have operated in Paulas case with Sally:
The attorney for Sallys Salon, the defendant in the slip and fall case,
makes a written offer of judgment to plaintiff Paula in the amount of
$50,000. Paulas attorney makes a written counteroffer of $70,000, setting
an ìaverage offerê of $60,000. At trial, Paula is awarded $55,000, which
does not improve upon the average set by offer and counteroffer. Paula is
now liable for costs and fees under the Offer of Judgment Rule even
though she won at trial.
At present, there is a carve–out in the Offer of Judgment rule for cases that have
been submitted for case evaluation.88 Costs are not awarded under the Offer of
Judgment rule for cases that have received unanimous case evaluation awards. 89 If
the case evaluation rules are changed to remove case evaluation sanctions, then this
carve out will likely be removed from the Offer of Judgement rule.
The Offer of Judgment rule does allow some judicial discretion as to whether
to award attorney fees. The court may refuse to award them ìin the interest of
justice.ê90 Michigan courts use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
denial of attorney fees under the interest–of–justice exception.91 A recent,
unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals opinion found that a trial court did not
is deemed to include all costs and interest then accrued.ê Parties sometimes debate whether an offer of
judgment can be used for claims that call for a mix of equitable and monetary relief. So long as the offer
does not require any action by the offeree (other than accepting the offer and stipulating to the judgment),
meaning, it covers only monetary damages and seeks the dismissal of equitable claims, then it is likely
a ìsum certainê under Michigans Offer of Judgment rule. McManus v. Toler, 810 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2010).
84. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(A)(3).
85. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(C).
86. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(D)(1)–(2). Allowing attorney fees is notable. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, on which many states offer–of–judgment statutes are modeled, only allows for costs
and does not include reasonable attorney fees. The lack of costs available under Rule 68 means it is very
rarely used. See, e.g., William P. Lynch, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: Lessons from the New Mexico
Experience, 39 N.M. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009).
87. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(D)(2).
88. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(E).
89. Theoretically, an attorney could follow a split panel decision in case evaluation with a written
settlement offer under the Offer of Judgment rule as a means of trying to hedge bets on potential routes
to requesting costs and fees, but this does not appear to be common in the state.
90. MICH. CT. R. 2.405(D)(3).
91. AFP Specialties Inc. v. Vereyken, 844 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Smith v.
Khouri, 751 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Mich. 2008) (holding it is an abuse of discretion when the trial courts
decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes) (internal quotations omitted)).
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abuse its discretion in concluding that a defendants offer of one dollar to settle a
claim was strategic, rather than meaningful, thus denying the defendant its attorney
fees.92 Michigan courts caution that the exception should not be applied ìabsent
unusual circumstances,ê though attempts at ìgamesmanshipê and lack of sincere
effort at negotiation may allow the exception.93
If offers of judgement increase in use throughout Michigan, there will likely be
a push to revisit the mechanics of the court rule. Comparisons with Ontario,
Canadas Rule 49 regarding offers to settle might be helpful.94 Notably, under Rule
49, the punishment for failure to accept a settlement offer falls more heavily on
defendants than on plaintiffs. If a plaintiff makes an offer that is refused by the
defendant and the plaintiff receives a judgment that is as favorable or more
favorable at trial, then the plaintiff is entitled to ìpartial indemnityê up to the date
of the offer and ìsubstantial indemnityê from the date of the offer.95 If the
defendants offer is refused and the plaintiff receives a judgment equally or less
favorable at trial, then the plaintiff is still entitled to the plaintiffs costs up to the
date of the offer and only pays the defendants indemnity costs from the date of the
defendants settlement offer.96 This incentivizes early (and later, improved)
settlement offers on the part of the defendantîat least in cases where the plaintiff
has a colorable claim as to the defendants liabilityîsince the cost–shifting only
works in the defendants favor after the offer to settle is made. Parties can also
make non–Rule 49 settlement offers at any time.97
If case evaluation is modified to take away the threat of sanctions for refusing
the evaluators award, the Michigan Offer of Judgment rule will likely see increased
use as attorneys attempt to pressure the other side to settle. In particular, it might
be used in conjunction with ADR processes like early neutral evaluation or
mediation. For example, it could be combined with early neutral evaluation such
that a party could use the evaluators award as a basis for a written offer to the other
side, who would then face sanctions if it did not accept the offer. Similarly, if the
parties went to mediation and came close to a settlement but were not able to settle,
then a written offer could be made based on the outcome at mediation.

C. Arbitration Variants
Case evaluation is akin to non–binding arbitration, and courts could consider
promoting arbitration as an alternative to case evaluation. They could also consider
92. 31341 Van Born Rd, LLC v. McPherson Oil Co., No. 342740, 2019 WL 2146507, at *3 (Mich.
Ct. App. May 16, 2019).
93. Vereyken, 844 N.W.2d at 518–19.
94. ONT. R. CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R. 49.02(1) (Can.).
95. ONT. R. CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R. 49.10(1) (Can.). ìSubstantial indemnityê costs essentially take
what the court would have awarded and applies a 1.5 multiplier. See ONT. R. CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R.
1.03(1)(f) (Can.). As with case evaluation awards or offers of judgment in Michigan, there may be some
debate whether the result obtained at trial is more favorable. For monetary damages, courts take into
account both the amount awarded at trial and prejudgment interest in comparing settlement offers and
trial awards. For non–monetary relief, it is harder to compare Rule 49 offers and trial awards, but courts
seem likely to err on the side of awarding Rule 49 costs for reasonable offers. See generally ONT. R.
CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R. 49 (Can.).
96. ONT. R. CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R. 49.07(2) (Can.).
97. See ONT. R. CIV. P., R.R.O. 1990, R. 49.13 (Can.). Of course, this means that practitioners in
Ontario need to be careful when making offers to settle in writing that they clearly mark written offers
that are not meant to fall under Rule 49.
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mediation–arbitration, or ìmed–arb,ê in which the same neutral serves both as a
mediator and, if the parties fail to settle in mediation, becomes the arbitrator for the
case.98 These processes are likely to have similar drawbacks to case evaluation and
evaluative mediation, respectively. Finding panels of arbitrators with sufficient
expertise may prove difficult, and parties are likely to engage in the same delayed
briefing tactics as in case evaluation. Further, making mediation more evaluative
may diminish some of the features that make mediation a valuable alternative
process. Moreover, unique structural and ethical issues arise when the same neutral
is being used for both the mediation and arbitration processes. These include
concerns about the value of mediations confidentiality when the arbitrator learns
information in mediation that might affect the arbitrators award, including
information learned ex parte through caucusing with parties.99

D. Mini Trials
Another process that could at least partially replace case evaluation is the mini–
trial, which Michigan already encourages judges to consider in cases with a
substantial amount in dispute and a party that ìdesires its èday in court.ê100 A mini–
trial empanels a mock jury that hears an abbreviated one to two–day trial and then
renders an advisory verdict. This would seem to address the goal of case evaluation:
putting a value on the dispute. The parties can establish their own rules for the trial,
which can also be combined with mediation to allow the mock jurys decision to be
heard by the parties if there is an impasse or as a starting point for negotiations.
Unfortunately, mini trials are expensive, and the parties foot the bill for the mock
jurors, not the state, so parties are only likely to agree to this process when there is
a large amount at stake.101

E. Data Analytics
Modern data analytics could be applied both in negotiation and other more
formal ADR settings. Scholars have long counseled parties to incorporate data
about similarly situated litigants into the decision–making around settlement, but
neutrals frequently perceive that parties have not done their homework or are
engaging in wishful thinking. Indeed, many, if not all, of the forms of dispute
resolution discussed in this Article are meant to address the inability of parties to
98. Jennifer Allison, Med–Arb/Arb–Med, HARV. LAW SCH. LIBRARY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://gui
des.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=310591&p=2078484 (Med–arb could be set up so that the arbitration
component is also non–binding. This is what an expressly evaluative mediation process in which the
mediator makes a mediators proposal at the end amounts to).
99. Ellen Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the Same Neutral: A Framework
for Judicial Review, 5 ARB L. REV. 219, 243–44 (2013) (arguing for two separate processes). For a
general discussion of med–arb, see Brian Pappas, MedæArb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 157 (2015).
100. Judges Guide to ADR Version 1.0, supra note 76, at 29. Note that sometimes the term mini trial
is used to refer to presentations made by attorneys to high–profile representatives of disputing parties
who have the authority to negotiate a settlement. These mini–trials are presided over by a neutral advisor
who may question the party representative during the process. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 430–32 (6th ed.,
2012).
101. Id. at 30.
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come up with a reasonable settlement figure, either due to lack of data or lack of
will. Certainly, overcoming this wishful thinking on the part of parties is a big part
of case evaluations value and appeal.
Case evaluation is diminishing in effectiveness because the evaluators
themselves are no longer significantly more knowledgeable as to what will happen
at trial than the parties and their counsel. Nowadays, the combination of the
vanishing jury trial (and with it the vanishing trial lawyer) and increased access to
databases that aid parties in setting an expected dollar value for their case make
parties less likely to place much stock in the awards given by attorney case
evaluators.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle might be the one that case evaluation was ostensibly
put in place to address: how do parties put a value on their case in a way that is
compelling enough to both parties that it convinces them to settle? Is this something
that parties can do on their own? Is this something that can be addressed in a non–
binding process?
Procedures to address data asymmetries are especially necessary in an era in
which access to data is expensive and proprietary. There is a plethora of products
currently available on the market to help negotiating parties.102 These include
databases like Lex Machina, Litigation Analytics and Case Evaluator (Westlaw),
LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement Analyzer, Premonition, and VerdictSearch
(ALM). To give an idea of the cost for these services, VerdictSearch offers
subscriptions for solo attorneys from $99 per month or day passes for $395.103
VerdictSearch also has print versions, e.g., VerdictSearch Michigan, with monthly
issues that list cases and give details like fact summaries, allegations, damages,
verdict amount, amount of demand, and party experts.104
There are also platforms more expressly aimed at negotiations and decision
analysis, like Picture It Settled, Litigation Risk Analysis, and Win Before Trial.105
Win Before Trial offers a product called The Mediators Assistant designed to help
mediators walk parties through a litigation analysis.106 These sorts of tools may be
particularly valuable right now, though costly, because many lawyers have yet to
incorporate them into their decision–making.107 Litigation analytics can be used
solely by the litigants themselves, but as tools like The Mediators Assistant
suggest, they can also be used by mediators (or other neutrals) to help the parties
explore settlement options. Facilitative approaches do not need to eschew
technology, which can be used not just online but also during in–person meetings.
102. See Detroit Mercy Law Students, ADR Section Co–Hosts Panel on Case Valuation, 26 DISP.
RESOL. J. 6 (2018), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/MICHBAR/2b10c098-e406-4777a199-33b9d3e7c568/UploadedImages/pdfs/Fall18.pdf.
103. LAW.COM, https://verdictsearch.com/plans-pricing/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
104. See id. (paper copies of these may be available at law libraries for parties and attorneys with
access).
105. See PICTURE IT SETTLED, http://www.pictureitsettled.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); LITIG.
RISK ANALYSIS, www.litigationrisk.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); LEGAL RISK MGMT., http://www.
winbeforetrial.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
106. The Mediator’s Assistant, LEGAL RISK MGMT., http://www.winbeforetrial.com/the-mediatorsassistant.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
107. See, e.g., Heather Heavin & Michaela Keet, Litigation Risk Analysis: Using Rigorous Projections
to Encourage and Inform Settlement, SSRN (Mar. 29, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=3148676. See generally MARJORIE CORMAN AARON, RISK & RIGOR: A LAWYERS GUIDE
TO DECISION TREES FOR ASSESSING CASES AND ADVISING CLIENTS (2019) (for lawyers and parties who
want to learn more about the mechanics of litigation risk analysis).
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Alyson Carrel and Noam Ebner highlight a few factors to consider about the
mediation clients of the future: they will expect information to be easily available
and intuitive, they will rely on peers rather than experts in making decisions, and
they will expect service providers to be visible, particularly online.108 One of the
ways that mediators will be able to provide value to their future clients is by helping
them sort through and understand the data that can inform their decision–making.109
It is here that court systemsîand the multi–door courthouses of the Twenty–
First Centuryîcan do the most good. The parties most likely to have access to
large data sets are those with the deepest pockets. The information asymmetries
that have long concerned those cautious about mediation and other private
settlement processes will only become greater as the pool of available data about
actual jury awards shrinks. Proponents of data sharing call for regulations that
require reporting of settlement data.110 State courts could start to provide this
service at a state level for civil cases being disposed of through court–connected
programs like case evaluation or mediation.
Indeed, providing more litigants with access to this type of information may be
one of the biggest services courts could provide, since defendants in the main body
of cases currently using case evaluation (tort) are likely to be insured. These
defendants likely have much more data on potential settlement values than they are
revealing to case evaluators, and they currently have few incentives to do so. For
similar reasons, private settlements are probably much more attractive to them. For
example, one negligence attorney pointed out that few insurance carriers will accept
a case evaluation award if there is the possibility of a non–confidential judgment
being entered against the defendant.111

F. Mediation
Finally, the most likely existing ADR process that courts will turn to in order
to fill the case evaluation gap is mediation. Returning to earlier calls for automatic
mediation, there is support to increase the use of mediation throughout the state.
These proposed changes to case evaluation provide an excellent opportunity to
expand mediations reach.
As attorneys transition away from the use of case evaluationîan involuntary,
evaluative procedureîand toward mediation, dispute resolution coordinators and
mediators must be wary of ìevaluation creep,ê the likelihood that Michigans
facilitative mediators will be pulled by state encouragement and market demand to
become more and more evaluative in their mediations.112 In fact, in the 2018 Case

108. Alyson Carrel & Noam Ebner, Mind the Gap: Bringing Technology to the Mediation Table, 2019
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20–21 (2019).
109. Id. at 32–33.
110. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1001–
1100H, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (for example, the CFPB Arbitration regulationsîwhich Congress
subsequently revokedîwould have required some aggregated reporting of arbitration awards).
111. Robert F. Riley, Is There a Future for Case Evaluation in Negligence Litigation?, 97 MICH. B.
J. 26, 29 (2018).
112. Office of Dispute Resolution, Mediator Training Standards & Procedures, MICH. COURTS 6 (Jan.
1, 2016), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/standards/odr/Medi
ator%20Training%20Standards%20and%20Procedures.pdf (the current mediator training guidelines for
Michigan do not prohibit teaching evaluative techniques but do call for ìemphasis on facilitative
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Evaluation Study, seventy–four percent of attorneys said they sometimes or often
ask mediators to suggest or propose a settlement amount in their cases.113 The
likelihood of evaluation creep seems greatest when trying to make mediation the
one–stop shop for all civil litigation.
This shift toward more legalistic forms of mediation is, of course, happening
widely, far beyond Michigans borders.114 Whereas a generation ago ìbeing
evaluativeê was one of the graver epithets leveled at mediator, the field has become
more and more open to mediators placing actual dollar figures and values on parties
cases. Mediator education programs now instruct mediators on how to craft a
ìmediators proposal.ê115 Commercial mediation providers allow for mediator
proposals in their rules.116
Mediation can be a very good fit for many of the cases that are referred to case
evaluation, but given the likelihood of evaluation creep, this is a good time to pause
and think about what mediation has been and can be in a court–connected setting.

V. WHAT MEDIATION IS AND MAY BECOME
Ultimately, this Article is arguing for policy choices that preserve a more
facilitative style of mediation. Definitions of what exactly constitutes facilitative
or evaluative mediation vary widely. Returning to the first generation of debates
over mediation styles, John Lande provides a succinct definition, saying mediators
who use ìa facilitative style focus on eliciting the principals opinions and refrain
from pressing their own opinions about preferable settlement options,ê while
mediators who use ìan evaluative style develop their own opinions about preferable
settlement options and may try to influence the principals to accept them.ê117 His
definition nicely captures the core of the debate about whether mediators should
express opinions as to preferred settlement options.

mediationê). Michigan Court Rules also state that training as a case evaluator is not qualification to
serve as a mediator in state courts. MICH. CT. R. 2.411(F)(3).
113. 2018 Case Evaluation Study, supra note 52, at 46.
114. Whether one considers evaluative or facilitative mediation styles, philosophies, or something
stronger, is a long–standing debate. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic:
Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 247 (2000). For a Michigan–based mediators
characterization of mediation styles, see Zena Zumeta, Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative, and
Transformative Mediation, MEDIATE.COM, https://www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2019) (because the likely comparison points in Michigan are facilitative versus evaluative, this
Article does not speak much about Folger and Bushs transformative mediation model).
115. See, e.g., Jeff Kichaven & Paul Van Osselaer, The -Mediator’s Proposal+, A.B.A. (Dec. 28,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/insurance-coverage/practice/2017/m
ediators-proposal/.
116. Mediation Procedure, CPR INTL INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION,
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/mediation/cpr-mediation-procedure (last visited Dec. 12,
2019) (ìFinally, if the parties fail to develop mutually acceptable settlement terms, before terminating
the procedure, and only with the consent of the parties, (a) the mediator may submit to the parties a final
settlement proposal; and (b) if the mediator believes he/she is qualified to do so, the mediator may give
the parties an evaluation (which if all parties choose, and the mediator agrees, may be in writing) of the
likely outcome of the case if it were tried to final judgment, subject to any limitations under any
applicable mediation statutes/ rules, court rules or ethical codes. Thereupon, the mediator may suggest
further discussions to explore whether the mediators evaluation or proposal may lead to a resolution.ê).
117. John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 322–23
(2000).
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A. Michigan Currently Defines Mediation as Facilitative
In its Michigan Judges Guide to ADR, the Michigan Supreme Court
categorizes all of its mediation options as ìFacilitative ADR Processes.ê118 On the
other hand, Michigans court rules already provide for ìevaluative mediationê in
domestic relations mediations, which the Judges Guide acknowledges. 119 In
domestic relations cases, parties must voluntarily participate in evaluative
mediation and, unlike other jurisdictions where the mediators proposal or
recommendation is reported to the court, the domestic relations mediators proposed
settlement is not reported to the court.120 However, adding evaluative mediation to
the court rules for general civil mediation seems unnecessaryîand potentially
misguidedîfor a couple of reasons.
First, adding evaluative mediation into the court rule will likely disincentivize
the use of facilitative mediation. Given the data suggesting that attorneys prefer
more evaluative processes, it seems likely that explicitly providing evaluative
mediation within the civil mediation rule as a process distinct from facilitative
mediation will lead to more market pressure on mediators to provide evaluations,
even if those mediators would prefer not to.
But why shouldnt mediators provide what the market wants? One may argue
that it is paternalistic to discourage parties from asking for the process that best fits
their preferred approach to resolving the case. Yes, and no. If parties want to hire
someone to give them a number, they can do that. But court–ordered mediation is
not a purely private enterprise; it is operating with the imprimatur of the state, often
using state funding as well. The state should, therefore, be able to weigh in on its
preferred process and the features it would like that process to have. The state does
not have to take an about–face on its approach to mediation just because it may be
diminishing the use of case evaluation, one of many evaluative ADR options
currently offered.
Second, there is nothing explicitly within the current court rule that says that
mediators cannot use more evaluative techniques like a mediators proposal. This
may sound like a counter–intuitive critique in light of the first point that the current
state definition of mediation has a facilitative focus. However, many mediators use
a range of techniques from facilitative to more evaluative. Mediators may choose,
for practical and philosophical reasons, not to use certain techniques. Adding
evaluative mediation to the court rules may result in more pressure on mediators to
use evaluative techniques. The point is that mediators who want to use evaluative
techniques like a mediators proposal are not forbidden from doing so under the
existing rules, but the rules also do not encourage or call for the use of such
techniques.
118. Judges Guide to ADR Version 1.0, supra note 76, at 19.
119. Id. at 24.
120. MICH. CT. R. 3.216(A)(2), 3.216(I). At the parties request, the mediator may provide a written
report to the parties with ìthe mediators proposed recommendation for settlement purposes only,ê and
the recommendation ìmay not be submitted or made available to the court.ê Id. at 3.216(I)(2). The rule
makes very clear that court officials cannot pressure the mediator or parties into discussing the
recommendation and that the court cannot ask who accepted or rejected the mediators recommendation,
read the recommendation, or admit the recommendation into evidence (unless both parties consent and
the court ìshall not request the parties consent to read the mediators recommendationê). Id at
3.216(I)(5)–(6).
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Potential benefits for formalizing an evaluative mediation process would be the
ability to maintain a clear distinction between more facilitative and more evaluative
models of mediation. Parties will need to be educated and informed by ADR
providers about the type of mediation in which they are going to participate. Having
these models specifically defined may also allow training programs to more directly
address the pros and cons of more facilitative and more evaluative techniques.
Since many general civil mediation trainings embrace a facilitative model of
mediation, either by choice or because the local courts call for facilitative methods,
scant attention is usually paid to evaluative techniques, and yet many mediators use
proposals and other evaluative techniques in their sessions.
The Judges Guide is forthright about the potential downsides to using a more
evaluative process, particularly the risks to the mediators perceived neutrality:
Evaluative mediation can be a useful tool where parties are unable to
generate options and would like the mediator to offer recommendations.
However, once the recommendations are provided, the mediator risks
losing effectiveness as a mediator in facilitating further settlement
discussions because the mediator may be perceived as exhibiting
favoritism or as no longer being neutral. For this reason, evaluative
mediation generally takes place toward the end of the parties negotiations
and after they have truly failed to reach consensus.121
The debate about the utility of continuing to use a facilitative/evaluative
framework for mediation is longstanding and unresolved.122 There is real value in
being deliberative about the methods that mediators are using to resolve disputes
and requiring mediators to obtain parties authorization up–front for the use of
techniques like a mediators proposal. Maybe this does not make much of a
difference in the end. Maybe the parties who are sophisticated enough to
understand what a mediators proposal is and what they are agreeing to are the
parties most likely to welcome the mediators proposal or be in a position to give a
firm ìno thank youê in advance, while the parties who are less knowledgeable will
simply nod their heads and acquiesce to whatever the mediator, the person with
seeming authority, says the process will be. Regardless of which model is chosen,
it is still useful for the mediator to outwardly declareîand inwardly embraceî
which model the mediator will be using in advance of the mediation.

B. Evaluative Mediation Models
Rather than suggesting that all evaluative mediation is bad, this Article argues
that the model expressly called for by courts should remain on the facilitative end
of the spectrum. However, since this Article also predicts that parties in a post–
case–evaluation sanctions world will increasingly request evaluative mediation, it
is worth considering how evaluative mediation should be done. In particular, it is
121. Judges Guide to ADR Version 1.0, supra note 76, at 24.
122. For a thoroughly footnoted, poetic take on the controversy, see Len Riskin, Mediation Quandaries,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV., 1007 (1997). For an article making similar points that mediation is replacing
arbitration, see Jacqueline Nolan–Haley, Mediation: The -New Arbitration+, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
61, 64 (2012) (ìLawyers generally control the mediation process, often preferring evaluative rather than
facilitative models.ê).
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important to make sure that both clients and counsel agree in advance to more
evaluative techniques like mediator proposals. The danger is that mediators will
progress from authoritative to authoritarian as more evaluative techniques become
more commonly used.
If mediators are going to embrace and consider a more deliberate approach to
using evaluative mediation techniques, then it is worth looking at the advice of
mediators who expressly promote their use. In Michigan, for example, the State
Bar Dispute Resolution Section hosts a yearly advanced mediation summit in which
trainers are brought in for a day–long training session. The 2019 trainer, Dwight
Golann, spent much of his training looking at the use of evaluative techniques and
counseling mediators on how to use them effectively. Golann warned mediators to
avoid their own ìjudgmental overconfidenceê: peoples tendency to be
unrealistically confident in their ability to predict uncertain outcomes.123 He
suggested that mediators be very clear about what kinds of opinions they are giving
to parties, and that mediator proposals should be based on an assessment of what
might lead to settlement in the given situation, rather than what the mediator thinks
is ìfairê or ìthe value of the case in court.ê124
One of the most detailed treatments of an evaluative approach to mediation is
James C. Freunds book Anatomy of Mediation.125 Freund posits that while there
are oftentimes opportunities to expand the pie à la Getting to Yes, there are also
some disputes that are simply ìone–shot dollar disputesê that call for a more
ìactivist and judgmentalê approach by the mediator.126 Freund requires that parties
agree in advance of the mediation to allow him to make a Proposed Resolution of
Dispute (the ìPRODê) if they do not reach a settlement during their mediation. He
bases his PROD on his perceived settlement value.127 In delivering his PROD,
Freund takes a week or two after a mediation has failed to settle and then gives the
same written proposal to both parties. However, he calls both sides separately and
offers reasoning specifically designed to persuade each side, starting with the merits
of that sides case and then moving on to the numbers, selling that side on his
number and explaining how he will sell the number to the other side.128 Freunds
is a well–thought–out system that has some quirks relative to typical mediation
practiceîhe does not carry numbers back and forth during the mediation, for
exampleîbut he provides an excellent explanation of how an evaluative mediator
comes to a number and attempts to convince parties to agree to it. 129
123. Erin R. Archerd, Professor Dwight Golann Tackles Evaluation and Disappointment in Mediation,
27 MICH. DISP. RESOL. J. 10 (2019).
124. Id. at 11 (stating that the mediator should give the same assessment to both sides ìand hold the
parties to making a firm yes/no answer on the mediators proposal in private . . . [f]inally, mediators
should give clear deadlines for responding to a mediators proposal.ê).
125. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MEDIATION: A DEALMAKERS DISTINCTIVE APPROACH TO
RESOLVING DOLLAR DISPUTES AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS (2012).
126. Id. at 51–63. He continues his critique of Getting to Yes later in the book: ìI find that in most
dollar disputes, when you look beneath the monetary positions a party makes, all you find are other,
somewhat more reasonable amounts of dollars. What the Getting to Yes people sometimes seem to
ignore it that these dollars are the real interests for most businesspeople. Money forms the principal
measuring stick of success or failure in the world of commerceîits how the players keep score.ê Id.
at 135.
127. Id. at 71–73, 170 (ìMy method of arriving at this non–binding determination is not as an arbitrator
might make an award, but on a compromise basis appropriate to a mediation.ê).
128. Id. at 176–77.
129. Id. at 119.
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As the legal systems embrace of evaluative mediation widens, a look at a
recently proposed model from Israel, ìauthority–based mediation,ê might be eye–
opening and provide a view of evaluative mediation taken to its most legalistic
extreme. The authors of AuthorityæBased Mediation view their approach as re–
establishing mediation in the legal sphere and increasing its appeal to lawyers.130
They describe authority–based mediation as an expressly court–connected process
in which difficult cases with represented parties are referred by a court to mediation
that uses ìauthoritarian elements that correspond with the dynamic that typifies
many courtroom encounters where a judge aims to bring the parties to an agreement,
even though he has no authority to make a judgment.ê131 The authors seem to feel
that mediators are unnecessarily critical of lawyers and have lost sight of the fact
that ìthe main goal of this mediation process is to reach an agreement.ê132 At the
same time, the authors emphasize that mediators must take great care to preserve
party autonomy and suggest that holding the mediations in the presence of lawyers,
ìwho could reflect to the parties the suggested reality and the legal analysis
provided by the mediator,ê sufficiently protects autonomous decision–making by
parties.133
Perhaps in response to anticipated critiques that this model will raise the threat
of private disregard for the rights of social minorities, the authors note that because
the mediator can lead parties in a normative dialogue that addresses issues of law
and justice rather than the parties personal interests, the authority–based mediation
model is better equipped to incorporate social values.134
Beyond the fact that this model would seem to run afoul of the requirement in
many U.S. jurisdictions that the mediator not give legal advice, it is unsettling to
see a mediation process that so fully embraces the mediator as private judge. At
what point does an appropriate use of authority cross the line into authoritarianism?
While mediated settlement agreements have somewhat greater scope for appeal
than an arbitration award, they are still far from easy to overturn. This feels like the
very sort of practice Delgado and other critical theorists decried and warned about
early in the adoption of mediation by courts; it takes what should be the formal
process itself, court, and privatizes it without necessarily providing safeguards for
bullying by the mediator.135
130. Amos Gabrieli, Nourit Zimerman, & Michal Alberstein, Authority–Based Mediation, 20
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 8 (2018) (describing the model as ìmore adaptable to the legal,
normative, adversarial sphereê).
131. Id. at 13. The authors describe its use in ìcases that were at the appeal stage, cases that involved
many parties, where any decision may lead to additional claims toward new parties, [and] cases that were
conducted in courts for many years but have not yet reached a final decision.ê Id. at 20.
132. Id. at 11; Menkel–Meadow, supra note 64 (the authors seem to be contrasting the views of Nancy
Welsh and Carrie Menkel–Meadow on the utility of lawyers in dispute resolution, but the articles they
cite are from very different time periods and contexts in each of Welshs and Menkel–Meadows
careers).
133. Gabrieli, Zimerman, & Alberstein, supra note 130, at 16. The approach seems to be: first convince
the lawyers that the mediators legal analysis is correct, and then the lawyers become ìthe mediators
long armê to convince parties to settle. Id. at 17.
134. Id. at 30, 45–46. The authors also seem to acknowledge that many mediators would not consider
this approach mediation at all. Id. at 39.
135. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985). The same line of critique was the
subject of a 2017 SMU Symposium, which can be found in Volume 70, Issues 3 and 4 of the SMU Law
Review (2017).
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Mediators have struggled, and will continue to struggle, to convince lawyers
that mediation is about more than getting parties to pick a dollar figure in the
middle.136 Yet, that is the mediators job: to bring a different approach to resolving
a conflict than what parties can expect from the litigation path. Mediator Jerry
Weiss cautions mediators not to ignore the intimate, human elements of mediation
because ì[t]he èfighters in the contest, usually lawyers, are trained to battle and
thereby run the risk of losing sight of those elements.ê137 As mediator Brigit
Sambeth Glasner puts it, ìit needs some courage on the part of the mediator to lead
the parties and their attorneys through a creative process whether the discussion
about money is only its very final act.ê138
Comments such as these suggest a reason for the increasing emphasis on
evaluative mediation in Michigan and elsewhere. The stakeholders choosing
mediation and making decisions about what style of mediation to useîwhether
they are representing clients or serving as judge over the lawsuit as a wholeîare
most often lawyers, themselves ìtrained to battleê and comfortable in a system
based on argument and evaluation, rather than consensus–building and
collaborative solutions.139 Of course, these stakeholders are likely to prefer
evaluative processes unless they can be educated about and become more familiar
with the benefits that facilitative processes can have (benefits that often bring little
to their bottom lines in a given case).
Michigans effort to get rid of case evaluation thus presents a defining question
to the ADR community. Two generations into the widespread use of mediation in
the United States, are we throwing in the towel on the project of persuading the
legal system that less–authoritarian models are possible, even within the court
systems? Are trends toward the privatization of justice leading us to greater comfort
with, and desire for, mediators that act as private judges? More importantly, do we
have the will to do anything about that?
Mediators may say that their responsibility is to give the clients what they want.
A more nuanced articulation might be, ìParties hire me to help them settle their
dispute, and so long as all the parties are on board for what Im doing as a mediator
and the ultimate decision whether to settle is voluntary, then Im being the best
mediator I can be for the parties.ê This brings us back to fundamental definitions
of mediation. Should Michigan and other jurisdictions experiencing a rise in
evaluative mediation split mediation into facilitation (as mediation is still called in
some Michigan courts) and early neutral case evaluation rather than lump more and
more into mediation? This would allow for more clarity in what process a neutral
is using with parties, and it might even allow for better study of the differences in
the methods being used with parties, along the lines of the case evaluation and
mediation studies that have already been done in Michigan. This might also be
achieved by preserving facilitation/facilitative mediation and encouraging greater
use of mini–trials, at least for more complex legal disputes.
But is it too late? With so many mediators consciously or unconsciously using
evaluative techniques in mediation, are attempts to more clearly delineate between
a facilitative mediation process and an evaluation process doomed to failure?
136. See, e.g., Hal Abramson et al., Are Legal Disputes Just About the Money? Answers from Mediators
on the Front Line, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 12 (2017).
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Nolan–Haley, supra note 122, at 82–83.
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Mediation is the core of the ADR movement.140 If we do not take the opportunity
to preserve non–evaluative styles of mediation, those styles may be lost.

C. -Good Mediation?+: Empirical Data is Still Inconclusive
Court–annexed ADR is now in its second or third generation in U.S. courts.
Twenty years ago, around the same time that mediation was added to the court rules
in Michigan, researchers and courts were taking a serious look at ADR programs
and trying to tease apart the various goals and methods of ADR procedures.141 The
Riskin Grid ignited controversy in the field for its suggestion that more evaluative
styles of mediation were part of the typical mediators practice.142 Scores of
researchers pushed back on the notion that evaluative mediation even was
mediation.143 While there had not been much empirical research comparing
mediation styles or techniques, what research did exist suggested that court–
connected mediation, regardless of the model espoused, was generally evaluative,
that litigants had less of a role in the mediation than attorneys, and that attorneys
satisfaction with the process was linked to settlement, regardless of what means
were used to reach it.144
The data today is still unclear as to whether evaluative techniques lead to better
results. There is also still debate about how to gauge ìbetterê in the context of a
mediation. Generally speaking, studies of mediation effectiveness look at some
combination of parties satisfaction with the process (procedural measures) and, if
possible, the results the parties receive (substantive measures).145 A 2017 American
Bar Association (ìABAê) meta–study on mediator techniques looked at forty–
seven articles and research reports that the ABA task force deemed to ìhave
sufficient findings regarding the action–outcome link.ê146 Its results about mediator
techniques and their outcomes tended to support a more facilitative approach,
though only modestly. The ABA study grouped mediation outcomes into three
categories:

140. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, In Search of -Good+ Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice, and
Empiricism, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 231 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds.,
2001) (ìAt the core of the ADR movement is the promise of mediation.ê).
141. Id.
142. Stempel, supra note 114. For those reading about this controversy for the first time, in his ìGrid
for the Perplexed,ê Len Riskin laid out an X–axis of ìproblem–definitionê from narrow to broad and a
Y–axis of the mediators role from facilitative to evaluative. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
7, 7 (1996). The Y–axis inspired the most controversy and led to a number of conferences organized
around whether evaluative techniques could even be considered proper mediation. See, e.g., Stempel,
supra note 114; Lande, supra note 25; Carrie Menkel–Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes of its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Resolution Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997);
Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937,
946 (1997).
143. Love, supra note 142, at 939.
144. Hensler, supra note 141, at 255.
145. Results are not just numbers, but represent whether or not the parties reach a mediated settlement
and the durability of the agreement, meaning whether or not the parties actually follow through on the
commitments made in the mediated settlement.
146. A.B.A. Section of Dispute Resolution, Report of the Task Force on Research on Mediation
Techniques, A.B.A. 9 (June 12, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administ
rative/dispute_resolution/med_techniques_tf_report.pdf.
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1) settlement and related outcomes, including joint goal achievement,
personalization of the mediated agreement, reaching a subsequent consent
order, or filing post–mediation motions or actions; 2) disputants
relationships or ability to work together and their perception of the
mediator, the mediation process or the outcome; and 3) attorneys
perceptions of mediation.147
It then grouped study results into three categoriesînegative, no effect, or
positiveîfor various techniques. For example, does a mediator offering
suggestions (i) decrease settlement rates, (ii) have no effect on settlement rates, or
(iii) increase settlement rates?
Broadly speaking, the ABA meta–study suggests mediators pressuring
disputants to settle either had no effect or increased settlement rates, but may lead
to decreased settlement values and more negative impressions of mediation.148
More evaluative methods like offering recommendations, suggestions, evaluations,
or opinions also had no effect or increased settlement and had more mixed to
favorable impacts on outcomes and perception of the process.149 Looking
specifically at times when ìevaluation in various formsê was used, the studies
examined found that attorneys were especially pleased with the process.150
While the ABA task force found few studies looking at the effectiveness of
more facilitative techniques, like mediators eliciting suggestions or solutions from
the parties, the studies it did review suggested that more facilitative techniques
increase settlement rates and decrease parties need to return to court to enforce the
settlements.151 The Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts commissioned
studies in both general civil and family law areas, which were included in the ABA
study. The Maryland studies remain some of the strongest sources of support for
the use of elicitive or eliciting techniques, which includes ìasking participants what
solutions they would suggest, summarizing the solutions being considered, and
checking in with participants to see how they think those ideas might work for
them.ê152
Overall, the ABA task force felt that more relational techniques like building
trust (including the use of pre–mediation caucuses) and eliciting disputants
suggestions or solutions held greater potential for increasing both settlement and
disputants satisfaction.153 Conversely, the task force issued cautionary notes about
processes that involve recommended settlement options or case evaluations, noting
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. at 21. In particular, settlement was more likely in civil cases where mediators recommended
a settlement than when they did not.
150. Id. at 30. Much of the data showing support for at least some evaluative techniques comes from
Roselle Wisslers 2002 study. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court–Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641 (2002).
151. Report of the Task Force on Research on Mediation Techniques, supra note 146, at 31.
152. Id. (citing Admin. Office of the Courts, What Works in District Court Day of Trial Mediation:
Effectiveness of Various Mediation Strategies on Short– and Long–Term Outcomes, MD. JUDICIARY
(2016), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/courtoperations/pdfs/districtcourtstrategiesfullre
port.pdf. Even the MACRO study, however, found that mediators offering opinions and solutions did
not relate to disputant perceptions of the mediation process or the mediator and that only when mediators
had offered opinions and solutions to a greater degree did disputants express less satisfaction with the
outcomes when surveyed several months after the mediation.
153. Report of the Task Force on Research on Mediation Techniques, supra note 146, at 51.
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that such evaluative processes could negatively affect disputants relationships and
their perceptions of the mediation.154
Even so, the task forces conclusions were tentative at best. Thus, twenty years
into the debates about whether facilitative or evaluative techniques are ìbetterê in
mediation, the data is still inconclusive. The fact that we still need more empirical
data on effectiveness of various techniques suggests that there is some value in
maintaining a facilitative model of dispute resolutionîor, at a minimum, that we
should hesitate before getting rid of facilitative processes on grounds that parties
prefer evaluative options.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts should continue to promote processes that provide parties with informed
alternatives to litigation. If Michigan removes sanctions from case evaluation, then
stakeholders should consider what will rise to take case evaluations place.
Attorneys, in particular, like the anchoring effect that having an independent
partys opinion can bring to settlement negotiations. For attorneys seeking a
number around which to negotiate, and perhaps a neutral scapegoat to point to in
talking clients down from unrealistic expectations, early neutral evaluation would
be a good alternative. This might be especially attractive to court programs
currently using case evaluation to triage high volumes of tort cases. For counsel
who like the idea of receiving an opinion on the merits of their case, arbitration
variants or mini–trials might afford a similar chance to present arguments and have
a neutral or mock jurors weigh–in on the persuasiveness of each sides case. These
options, however, may be cumbersome for courts to provide and less accessible for
many parties. For those attorneys seeking to promote settlement through the threat
of sanctions, greater use of offers of judgment provides an alternative to case
evaluations sanctions. However, the rise of gamesmanship by parties looms large,
and judges need to have considerable discretion in enforcing the offer of judgement
rule in a way that encourages good faith negotiations by the parties.
Sometimes parties may want to discuss options without having a third party
weigh in on their case. For those who want an opportunity to explore settlement
options, and especially those who would like to do so early in their case, mediation
is attractive. Users should be informed about the different styles of mediation, and
courts should continue to promote facilitative mediation as a non–evaluative
alternative to the many evaluative ADR options available to parties. Courts should
also educate and direct parties to data sources that will allow them to draw a more
informed vision of settlement numbers. Having numbers at hand will help parties
independently settle their cases or better equip them to participate in the ADR
processes discussed above. Finally, neutrals, especially mediators, should be
trained to have a greater awareness of evaluative techniques and how to use data
analytics in helping parties settle cases. It does no good to ignore the fact that many
parties will desire these services, but it does much good to be deliberate when using
them.

154. Id. at 54.
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VII. THE FUTURE OF ADR: THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES
This Article is meant to be a celebration of the panoply of processes available
to disputants in the United States, generally, and the state of Michigan, in particular.
It advocates for offering a broad variety of procedures, rather than using a one–
size–fits–all approach. One of the approaches can and should be litigation.
Likewise, one of the approaches can and should be mediation. Legal
stakeholdersîcourts, ADR providers, lawyers, and the people they serveîshould
work to preserve some of mediations important distinctions from more evaluative
alternatives.
Over the years, attorneys and judges perceptions of the effectiveness of case
evaluation have dropped along with the number of plaintiffs accepting case
evaluators awards. At least among lawyers, this dissatisfaction seems to be tied to
the lack of persuasiveness of the case evaluators awards. Perhaps this discontent
with case evaluation may have common roots with the discontent over the growing
use of arbitration, particularly by private persons rather than businesses, as a means
of resolving disputes. In an era in which well–trained and experienced neutrals are
plentiful, parties resent being forced into a court alternative in which they do not
have a significant degree of autonomy over the decision–making process. Although
case evaluation is a non–binding process, it involves a similar loss of autonomy by
parties to arbitration. Indeed, it looks very similar in practice to an arbitration, in
which there are abbreviated briefings and a panel renders a decision.
While evaluative mediation still provides parties with decision–making
autonomy, it strips the mediation process of a great deal of self–determination.
Making mediation more evaluative, whether by court rule or local practice, runs the
risk of creating the same complaints about mediators as are currently being leveled
at case evaluators. Vanishing trial experience affects lawyers and lawyers–turned–
mediators alike. Once they receive enough proposals from enough mediators,
attorneys are likely to find that their court–appointed neutrals are not expert enough
in the subject area.
In the early 2000s, Deborah Hensler made the observation that evaluative
mediation looks more like a judicial settlement conference but that facilitative
mediation ìespouses more revolutionary goals.ê155 Despite the jokes about
ìMichigan Mediation,ê Michigan has kept the facilitative mediation revolution
going for one more generation. As an idealist, and as someone who believes in the
power of a model that deliberately and consciously rejects an authoritarian neutral,
I would encourage Michiganders, and ADR programs across the country, to keep
promoting mediation as a process in which the mediators primary goal is to help
parties uncover interests and create value.
If mediation is meant to be a true alternative to litigation, then it needs to be
more than private judging. As one of the participants in Michigans 2018 ADR
Summit put it, ìIf mediation is evolving into traditional settlement conferences,
what value would mediation hold in the future?ê156 There is room within the
spectrum of ADR offerings for processes like early neutral evaluation to give parties
a dollar figure around which to negotiate. There is room for preserving sanctions

155. Hensler, supra note 140, at 231.
156. 2018 ADR Summit Meeting Summary, supra note 68, at 3.
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through offers of judgment. Case evaluation does not need to become evaluative
mediation.
This discussion is part of a broader one about the direction that dispute
resolution, particularly mediation, is taking in the United States. As Doug Yarn
recently put it at the Appreciating Our Legacy conference at Pepperdine, the field
of ADR as a whole has shifted its ethos from relational to transactional. 157 This
shift is reflected in approaches like James Freunds, which identifies two key
difficulties in resolving disputes: the first is emotional and the second is ìassessing
the litigation alternative.ê158 Freund places greater weight on this second difficulty,
and his preferred approach of evaluative mediation flows from it. Has this shift
occurred because mediation has been ineffective in addressing relational concerns?
Is this the inevitable result of bringing processes like mediation into the legal realm?
The answers to both of these questions can be ìno.ê Mediation can still address
relational concerns, even in seemingly ìmoney onlyê disputes. Legal stakeholders
can still create spaces for people to talk about issues beyond legal rights and dollar
values, and mediation offers an opportunity to try to address things like inevitable
emotional issues.
Todays lawyers are capable of understanding and embracing the differences
among ADR processes. Every year, a new crop of would–be lawyers in law school
across the United States take an ADR class because they say they want to be
problem–solvers for their clients. Many lawyers today are excellent negotiators,
well–versed in interest–based negotiation theory and the many forms of ADR.
Michigan has a well–coordinated and sophisticated ADR landscape. It is
already a leader in many forms of ADR, as with its statutory mandate that schools
consider restorative practices in their disciplinary procedures, which has led to the
growth of restorative circles and conferences in schools throughout the state over
the past five years.159
There is a pleasing simplicity in making mediation the one–size–fits–all
alternative to litigation. Yet, practicing neutrals are often used to wearing many
hats, from arbitrator to mediator to facilitator and various points in between, or to
consciously choosing to stick primarily or predominately with one process, such as
mediation. Preserving mediation as a more facilitative process will help those
mediators who choose to practice in that manner. Offering other evaluative ADR
processes like early neutral evaluation will allow neutrals who so choose to market
themselves as both evaluators and mediators.
This Article is not intended to be Pollyannaish about the superiority of
facilitative mediation over other forms of ADR, but it is meant to be bullish about
giving facilitative mediation a chance as a type of mediation in the United States.
There are many forms of evaluative ADR that can serve the purpose of setting
clients expectations and giving parties a figure around which to negotiate. Soon,
there will be technological tools that will give attorneys an even better sense of
these numbers than a human being ever could.
This may be our fields last chance to take a normative and empirical stand for
facilitative mediation in the United States, especially with regard to commercial
disputes. We do not need to make mediation evaluative for it to continue to serve
157. Appreciating Our Legacy & Engaging Our Future: An International Conference for Dispute
Resolution Teachers, Scholars, & Leaders, PEPPERDINE SCH. OF LAW (June 18–19, 2019).
158. FREUND, supra note 125, at 170.
159. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310(c) (West 2017).
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a valuable role as an alternative to litigation. By preserving mediation as a
facilitative process, Michigan, which has shown a continued commitment to
empirical examination of its ADR processes, can play a part in adding to our
empirical knowledge about the effectiveness of facilitative mediation.
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